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HIS article provides an update of certain significant developmentsTin franchise law in Texas and in the Fifth Circuit during the Survey
period. It also highlights important cases from outside Texas,
some involving dealerships and distributorships that, in the authors' judg-
ment, provide a relevant backdrop for franchising. Cases during the Sur-
vey period dealt with a range of provocative issues-from the now almost
pedestrian analysis of jurisdiction connected to internet sites to the
"newly discovered" duty of good faith and fair dealing in franchise agree-
ments under Texas law. In addressing the specific areas that affect
franchise and distribution systems, however, the update has not at-
tempted to explain the entire body of franchise law but, instead, has fo-
cused on particularly instructive cases.
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
At least three noteworthy personal jurisdiction cases fell within this
Survey period. Two cases focus on the newly charted territory of per-
sonal jurisdiction and internet websites. Based on those cases, it is be-
coming increasingly difficult to establish jurisdiction, specific or general,
by basing your claim on the interactivity of a website. The third case
strays from internet websites and instead focuses on the more charted
territories of prior negotiations, contemplation of future consequences,
terms of contracts, and the parties' actual course of dealing.
In Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. Dads and Mad Moms Against
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Drug Dealers,' the court dismissed the complaint finding the website
lacked enough interactivity to confer specific jurisdiction. In this case,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) alleged claims of trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition in violation of
federal and state law. MADD is a non-profit, District of Columbia cor-
poration headquartered in Irving, Texas. Dads and Mad Moms Against
Drug Dealers (DAMMADD) is a non-profit corporation with its princi-
pal place of business in Tioga Center, New York, and all of DAM-
MADD's employees are New York residents. DAMMADD responded
to MADD's claims by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction and improper venue. Since the Texas long-arm statute confers
jurisdiction to the limit of the federal constitution, the court only dis-
cussed the federal due process inquiry.2
To exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, due
process requires two elements be met. First, the non-resident must have
some minimum contact with the forum state. Second, it must be fair or
reasonable to require the non-resident to defend the suit in that forum
state.3 Minimum contact means that a non-resident defendant must do
something to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum state. If a defendant purposefully avails himself,
he invokes the benefits and protections of that state's laws. Courts make
it clear that the unilateral activity of one asserting a relationship with the
non-resident defendant does not satisfy this requirement. 4
Based on a defendant's contacts with the forum state, either specific or
general jurisdiction may be exercised on the defendant. Specific jurisdic-
tion exists if the cause of action is related to, or arises out of, the defen-
dant's contacts with the forum and those contacts meet the due process
standard. General jurisdiction, on the other hand, may be found when
the claim is unrelated to the non-resident's contacts with the forum but
where those contacts are continuous and systematic. 5
In this case, MADD argued that DAMMADD had sufficient minimum
contacts with Texas for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
DAMMADD. MADD pointed to DAMMADD's website and its use of
the website to solicit and collect donations as well as sell products to sat-
isfy specific jurisdiction. Further, MADD argued that DAMMADD's
website provided contacts with the forum that were significant enough
that DAMMADD should reasonably have anticipated being sued in
Texas. The court was not convinced. 6
In supporting its decision, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit's sliding
scale test to determine whether defendant's operation of an internet web-
1. Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. Dads and Moms Against Drug Dealers, No.
3:02-CV-1712-G, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1800 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2003).
2. Id. at *2, 5, 8, 10-11.
3. Id. at *11.
4. Id. at *126.
5. Id. at *13-14.
6. Id. at *15-16.
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site provides the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. In
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,7 the court established
a sliding scale test to evaluate the nature and quality of commercial activ-
ity that an entity conducts over the internet. This sliding scale analysis
categorizes internet use into a three-point spectrum. At one end is a
completely passive website where jurisdiction would be inappropriate.
The other end of the spectrum is where a defendant clearly does business
over the internet by entering into contracts with residents of other states.
This involves the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files
over the internet. In that situation, jurisdiction is proper. In the middle
of the spectrum is an interactive website. An interactive website allows a
visitor to exchange information with a host computer.8 The court classi-
fied DAMMADD's website as an interactive website falling somewhere
in the middle of the spectrum. In determining how interactive DAM-
MADD's website was, the court looked at the level of inter-activity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the
website.9
The court, while noting that DAMMADD's website clearly allowed a
visitor to interact and exchange information with a host computer by sub-
mitting anonymous drug activity tips, making donations, and purchasing
products, still found that the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of DAMMADD's website were not sufficient to warrant an exercise of
specific jurisdiction. The court pointed to numerous facts that differenti-
ated this case from others where the court found personal jurisdiction.
First, of the 786 anonymous tips the website received, only twenty came
from Texas, which was less than three percent. Plus, none of these tips
were ever used by law enforcement, much less given a reward, for the
receipt of the tip. Second, less than two percent of donations DAM-
MADD received came from Texas. 10
Finally, while DAMMADD's website offered a few products for sale, it
was not a virtual store. Rather, only a very small portion of the website
sold products. In fact, the website sales only included two main items-
certain drug kits and posters. MADD's argument is weakened even more
considering that only two Texas consumers had actually chosen to
purchase a product offered over the DAMMADD website. 11 The court
found that "these web-based contacts simply fail[ed] to paint the picture
of a significantly commercial website that is visited regularly by Texas
residents." 12
While the court in Mothers Against Drunk Driving grappled with spe-
cific jurisdiction, in Reiff v. Roy, 13 the court tackled general jurisdiction
7. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
8. Id. at 1124.
9. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1800, at *19.
10. Id. at *20-23.
11. Id. at *21-22.
12. Id. at *22.
13. Reiff v. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
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and internet websites. The court addressed whether the internet website
in question met the even more demanding minimum contacts analysis re-
quired to assert general jurisdiction than that required for specific juris-
diction. To establish general jurisdiction, a nonresident must engage in
systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state. An important
distinction is that the events in general jurisdiction that give rise to the
suit do not have to occur in that state. 14
In Reiff, the plaintiff argued that the court had general jurisdiction over
the defendants based mostly on a website that the defendants maintained.
When analyzing internet websites and general jurisdiction, the court used
a sliding-scale analysis identical to the one discussed above in Zippo. The
same three categories are used in the analysis of this case. At one end
you have a passive website that will not confer jurisdiction, and at the
other end is a website clearly used for business purposes that will confer
jurisdiction. The website in this case fell in the middle of the spectrum as
an interactive website that, depending on the amount of interaction,
could swing either way.15
Plaintiff argued that the court had general jurisdiction because the
website was clearly interactive. In support of this, he claimed that the
defendants' website advertised and solicited business on the Internet,
gave driving directions, provided a map, and allowed guests to make res-
ervations through the website. The court, while considering these were
true, noted they did not show systematic and continuous contacts be-
tween the defendant and Texas. The court also considered other factors.
Defendants were residents of Colorado and they operated their hotel in
Colorado. Defendants had never directly engaged in any business activi-
ties in Texas, had no employees, office, registered agent, or property in
Texas, and were not authorized to do business in Texas. Plus, the
franchisor was responsible, rather then the defendants, for operation of
the website. Finally, there was no evidence that the plaintiff ever made a
reservation at the defendants' hotel through the website or that the web-
site was directed towards Texans. 16
Unlike the two prior cases, the third noteworthy personal jurisdiction
case found personal jurisdiction. In ICEE Distributors, Inc. v. J & J
Snack Foods Corp.,1 7 the court exercised personal jurisdiction by looking
to the defendant's prior negotiations, contemplation of future conse-
quences, terms of contracts, and the parties' actual course of dealing.' 8
In ICEE, a regional distributor brought a suit against a trademark
owner, alleging breach of a licensing agreement; against another distribu-
tor which sold the same product but in a slightly different form within
plaintiff's territory; and against a store where the slightly different prod-
14. Id. at 704-05.
15. Id. at 705-07.
16. Id. at 706.
17. ICEE Distrib., Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 325 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 591-92.
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uct was sold, alleging trademark infringement and dilution. The question
was whether the Louisiana court could exercise jurisdiction over the
trademark owner, a Texas corporation, with its principal place of business
in California. The court found that the trademark owner had sufficient
minimum contacts with Louisiana to support an exercise of jurisdiction.
Specifically, the trademark owner's predecessor granted the distributor
an exclusive license within a region that included most of Louisiana. The
predecessor accepted the long-term relationship that contemplated its
oversight of the distributor's actions in that territory. The owner's licens-
ing of another distributor in the territory overlapped geographically with
the regional distributor's territory and caused foreseeable injuries to the
distributor. All of these factors made it clear to the court that personal
jurisdiction was proper.19
B. CHOICE OF LAW
In analyzing which state's law to apply to an issue, courts typically give
weight to the parties' choice-of-law provision in the franchise agreement.
But when there is a dispute over the applicability of such a provision, the
court will look in other directions. The first case involving choice of law
applies a substantial relationship test to decide which state law applies,
and the second case shows what can happen when a plaintiff argues for a
choice-of-law provision that ultimately dismisses two of the plaintiff's
claims.
In Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mexico, Inc.,20 the
court used a substantial relationship test to determine which forum gov-
erned. In their motion to dismiss, counter-defendants claimed that
counter-plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for violation of the New
Mexico Unfair Practices Act because New Mexico's law did not apply to
the dispute. The court ultimately concluded that Texas law, not New
Mexico law, applied and dismissed counter-plaintiff's claims.21
In deciding this case, the court analyzed the Texas choice-of-law provi-
sion, noting that a federal court in a diversity case applied the choice-of-
law rules of the forum state. "Under Texas law, the parties' choice of law
will be enforced unless the chosen law has no substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction or application of the law chosen would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state that has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of a particular is-
sue." 22 The agreement at issue contained a choice-of-law provision that
stated: "The Agreement takes effect upon its acceptance and execution
by Licensor in the State of Texas, and shall be construed under the laws
19. Id. at 592-93.
20. Tex. Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D.
Tex. 2003).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 907-08.
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thereof, which law shall prevail in the event of any conflict of law."23
Counter-plaintiffs argued that this provision did not include their tort
claims. 24
The court first analyzed the scope of the Agreement's choice-of-law
provision to decide whether the choice-of-law provision included the de-
veloper's tort claims. The provision referred to "This Agreement," which
restricts the clause to the agreement itself. The provision did not extend
to the general rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, the court
applied Texas choice-of-law rules to determine which law applied to the
developer's tort claims. 25
Texas choice-of-law rules apply a significant relationship test when the
parties have not agreed to the application of law. The significant relation-
ship test considers where the injury occurred, where the conduct causing
the injury occurred, the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpo-
ration and place of business of the parties, and where the relationship is
centered. Applying the test, the court concluded that the injury occurred
in New Mexico, the conduct causing the injury occurred in Texas and
New York, the domiciles and residences differed and offered no help, and
that the relationship was centered in Texas. If the court looked at these
considerations only, then Texas law would dominate. The court, how-
ever, must consider another element. 26
The final element implicated in this case was the certainty, predictabil-
ity, and uniformity of result factor. The court noted that this factor was
important in this case because the other factors, if considered alone,
could create different results stemming from the same contract with the
same Franchisor but with different Franchisees. This last element would
protect the Franchisor by focusing on the single state which had a sub-
stantial relationship to every contract. After considering the certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result factor, the court still concluded
that Texas law would apply because the franchisor was located there.27
In Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA Co.,28 a group of more than forty
franchisees brought an action against their franchisor. "The crux of the
[franchisees'] complaints [was] that Baskin Robbins ... [had] decided not
to renew their franchise agreements and that Baskin Robbins [allegedly]
mishandled funds in a common advertising fund."' 29 The franchisees op-
erated in several states, including Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas,
and Louisiana. None of the franchisees operated or resided in California.
This alone was enough for the court to conclude that the California
choice-of-law provision should fail because California Franchise Acts do
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 909-10.
26. Id. at 908-10.
27. Id.
28. Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA, Co., No. 5:99-CV-274, 2003 WL 21309428 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 2003).
29. Id. at *1.
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not apply to franchisees who neither operate nor reside in California.
Nevertheless, the franchisees still argued that California law should ap-
ply. Specifically, the franchisees claimed two California statutes were in-
corporated into the contract's terms. After reviewing the choice-of-law
provision, the court found that the provision clearly excepted the statutes
from applying. The court dismissed all of the franchisees' claims based on
the two California statutes.30
C. FORUM SELECTION
Under the topic of franchise law and forum selection, there was one
pivotal case during this Survey period that encompassed a wide variety of
forum selection issues. In My Caf6-CCC, LTD v. LunchStop, Inc.,31 the
court analyzed three different forum selection issues: (1) the enforceabil-
ity of forum selection clauses under Section 35.53 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code,32 (2) what a movant must prove to have a forum
selection clause voided because it was procured by fraud, and (3) the ap-
plication of forum selection clauses to fraudulent inducement claims.33
My Caf6 executed four franchise agreements with LunchStop. After
My Caf6 alleged a breach of the agreements, it filed suit in Dallas
County, Texas against LunchStop seeking to recover damages based on
fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. My Caf6 alleged that
venue was proper in Dallas County because LunchStop committed a tort
in Texas and also because the forum selection clauses in the franchise
agreements did not comply with Section 35.53(b) of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code.34 My Caf6 contended that it was exercising its
right under the code to void the forum selection clauses in the agree-
ments. LunchStop filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, stating the
court did not have jurisdiction because of the valid forum selection
clauses in the offering circulars. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss because of the contractual forum selection requirement in the
agreement to litigate in California. My Caf6 appealed. 35
My Caf6 claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing its suit because
the forum selection clauses were unenforceable by not complying with
Section 35.53 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, they were pro-
cured through fraud, and they were not applicable to causes of action for
fraudulent inducement. LunchStop first responded that Section 35.53 did
not apply to the franchise agreement because it had complied with Sec-
tion 41.104(b)(8) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and the fo-
rum selection clause was disclosed in the offering circular.36
30. Id. at *1, 4.
31. My Caf6-CCC, Ltd. v. LunchStop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
32. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53 (Vernon 2002).
33. My Cafg-CCC, Ltd., 107 S.W.3d at 865-67.
34. See § 35.53.
35. My Caff-CCC, Ltd., 107 S.W.3d at 863 n.4.
36. Id. at 864.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Forum selection clauses are enforceable in Texas, provided (1) the par-
ties have contractually consented to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of
another state, and (2) the other state recognizes the validity of such provi-
sions. Texas courts are not bound by the parties' selection of a forum
with regard to any cause of action if the interests of the public and poten-
tial witnesses strongly favor jurisdiction in a forum other than the forum
selected by the parties.37
My Caf6 argued, and the court analyzed, whether the parties contractu-
ally consented to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of another state.
Section 35.53 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code allows a party
to declare a forum selection clause void if certain conditions are met.38
My Caf6 met most of those conditions. The franchise contracts were for
less than $50,000, and My Caf6 was a limited partnership having its prin-
cipal place of business in Texas. 39 My Caf6 did not, however, prove that
Section 1.105 did not apply to the contract.40
Section 1.105 allows parties of a multi-state transaction the right to
choose their own law when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to
different states.41 The court held that Section 1.105 was applicable to this
contract because LunchStop's corporate headquarters are in Morgan Hill,
California. That gave LunchStop a reasonable relation to the State of
California. Therefore, the court found that Section 35.53(b) did not apply
to this transaction, the forum selection clauses were not void, and My
Caf6 contractually consented to the forum selection clauses. 42
Next, the court considered My Caf6's argument that the forum selec-
tion clauses were unenforceable because they were procured by fraud. In
order to prove unenforceability because of procurement by fraud, the
movant must present evidence on each element of fraud in the induce-
ment of the execution of the forum selection clause. The elements of
fraud that apply are (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) which was false,
(3) which was either known to be false when made or was asserted with-
out knowledge of the truth, (4) which was intended to be acted upon, (5)
which was relied upon, and (6) which caused injury. My Caf6 did not
present evidence on each of these elements. The only facts My Caf6
presented were that the representations in the offering circular were not
identical to the forum selection clauses in the agreements. The only dif-
ferences were the places designated to resolve the agreements. Some
named San Francisco, California, while others named Morgan Hill, Cali-
fornia. My Caf6 did not meet its burden of showing fraud in the induce-
ment because it failed to explain what the material misrepresentation was
or how it relied upon it to secure the forum selection clauses.43
37. Id. at 864-65.
38. § 35.53.
39. My Cafi-CCC, Ltd., 107 S.W.3d at 865.
40. Id.
41. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon 2002).
42. My Cafg-CCC, Ltd., 107 S.W.3d at 865.
43. Id. at 865-66.
1042 [Vol. 57
Franchise Law
Third, the court addressed the applicability of forum selection clauses
to particular causes of action. The application of a forum selection clause
to an asserted cause of action depended on the cause of action asserted
and the actual writing of the clause itself. When a forum selection clause
encompassed all causes of action concerning the contract, the claim that a
party was fraudulently induced to enter the contract does not avoid the
forum selection clause. Here, the court found that the forum selection
clause in the agreements applied to "[any dispute arising under or in
connection with" the agreements and "any claim affecting [their] validity,
construction, effect, performance, or termination."'4 4 Because the clause
encompassed all causes of action concerning the contract, a claim of
fraudulent inducement did not avoid the forum selection clause. 45
D. CLASS AcrIONS
During this Survey period, in a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit
addressed whether, under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA), 46 all named plaintiffs in a class action must be located in the
district where they filed suit for venue to be proper. In Abrams Shell v.
Shell Oil Co.,47 the court held that they did. In deciding this question, the
court first looked to the wording of the PMPA. 48
The PMPA contains a specific venue provision that authorizes a fran-
chisee to bring suit in either of two different venues: (1) the district in
which the franchisor has its principal place of business, or (2) the district
in which the franchisee is doing business.49 In this case, the first option
was satisfied because all defendant franchisors had their headquarters
and principal places of business in Houston, Texas. Plaintiffs, however,
still sought to have the case moved to California under option two even
though plaintiffs were located in three different states and up to five judi-
cial districts.50
In deciding against plaintiffs, the court looked to several sources, in-
cluding past Fifth Circuit district courts. Fifth Circuit district courts "have
consistently held that all named plaintiffs to a class action must satisfy the
venue requirements. ' 51 Following the district court decisions in other
cases, the court found that all named plaintiffs must be in the same dis-
trict for venue to be proper under the PMPA. Therefore, in this case,
venue was only proper in the Southern District of Texas, the district in
which the franchisor had its principal place of business.52
44. Id. at 866.
45. Id. at 866-67.
46. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2801 (2003).
47. Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 343 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2003).
48. See id. at 489.
49. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(a).
50. Abrams Shell, at 484-85.
51. Id. at 490.




The Fifth Circuit reinforced the strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion in Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Paramount Saturn, Ltd.53 An auto-
mobile franchisor sought to compel arbitration of a dispute with its
franchisee, in which the franchisee alleged the franchisor breached its
statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to sell three
dealerships to the franchisee. Although the franchise agreement con-
tained a broad arbitration provision, the franchisee argued that the dis-
pute was not arbitrable because the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (TMVB)
had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.5 4 The court disagreed. If the
Texas statute did happen to give the TMVB exclusive jurisdiction over
contractual disputes between franchisors and franchisees in the motor ve-
hicle industry, then the statute would be preempted by the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA),55 to the extent that it limited availability of
arbitration over such disputes. The court reemphasized the importance
of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The FAA will continue
to preempt state laws that act to limit the availability of arbitration.56
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION AND
NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Since Texas does not have a franchise relationship law that regulates
relationships between a franchisor and franchisee, it is often difficult dis-
tinguishing between different franchise claims. One case during this pe-
riod helped to clarify some points. The Fifth Circuit, in Abrams Shell v.
Shell Oil Co.,57 accomplished two important goals. First, Abrams Shell
distinguished between the often confused franchise topics of constructive
termination and constructive non-renewal. Second, Abrams Shell sup-
ported cases from other jurisdictions that held that absent evidence that a
franchisors failed to actually renew a contract, constructive non-renewal
did not exist.58
In Abrams Shell, the court makes an important distinction between
claims for constructive termination and claims for constructive non-re-
newal, noting that the two terms are often confused. To differentiate be-
tween these two claims, the court examined three ways that the PMPA
distinguished between the two claims.59 The PMPA is often used by
franchisors and franchisees to help regulate the franchise relationship.
53. Saturn Distribution Corp v. Paramount Saturn, Ltd., 326 F.3d 684, 687 (5th Cir.
2003).
54. Id. at 686 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 1.02, 3.01(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2001)).
55. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2003).
56. Saturn Distribution Corp., 326 F.3d at 687.
57. Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 343 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2003).
58. Id. at 486-89.
59. See id. at 486.
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The PMPA is a federal statutory scheme created to regulate the termina-
tion and non-renewal of petroleum franchise relationships. 60
The court first noted that the PMPA distinguished between termina-
tions of franchises and nonrenewals of franchise relationships. This dis-
tinction is meaningful because a franchise consists of "specific rights and
obligations under the franchise agreement," but the term "franchise rela-
tionship" refers to the actual "relationship between the parties. '61
The court then noted that the grounds upon which a franchise may be
terminated are not coextensive with the grounds for nonrenewal of a
franchise relationship.62 The grounds listed under the PMPA differ for
terminations and non-renewals. For example, the PMPA lists ten grounds
on which a franchise or franchise relationship may be ended; five are
available either to terminate or non-renew, five can be invoked only to
non-renew.
63
Third, the court noted that termination occurs prior to the conclusion
of the term, or the expiration date, stated in the franchise agreement. In
contrast, nonrenewal can only take place at the conclusion of the term, or
on the expiration date. 64 In other words, termination can happen at any
time, but nonrenewal typically occurs within a narrower temporal
context. 6
5
The court in Abrams Shell also analyzed whether there could be a
claim for constructive non-renewal absent evidence that a franchisor
failed to renew a contract. In the case, gasoline station franchisees
brought suit alleging that the franchisor violated the PMPA by presenting
a new and altered set of franchise agreements in a "take it or leave it"
manner. The cover letter to the new Agreements stated, "If you do not
sign and return the Lease and other enclosed documents in a timely man-
ner, be advised that Equilon will issue without further warning a non-
rescindable notice of non-renewal pursuant to the terms of the
[PMPA]." 66 Sales consultants for one or more of the defendants allegedly
indicated to plaintiffs that the new agreements had to be signed "as is,"
without making any changes to the agreements. The plaintiffs objected to
the content of the New Agreements but eventually signed them without
making any changes and continued to operate their gasoline service
stations.67
The court noted that the defendants never actually terminated or re-
fused to renew their franchise agreements with the plaintiffs. 68 In fact,
the opposite occurred. The plaintiffs signed the new agreements and con-
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2801 (2003).
61. Abrams Shell, at 486.
62. Id. at 486.
63. Id. (citing Bridges Enters., Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 820 F.2d 123,124 (5th Cir.
1987)).
64. Id. at 486 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a) (2003)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 485.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 486.
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tinued to operate as franchisees. For this reason, plaintiffs only alleged
that their franchise agreements were constructively nonrenewed. 69 Since
the plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that the defendants failed to
renew the agreements, the plaintiffs did not show a breach in the
franchise relationship and the claims were dismissed.70
B. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
In another Fifth Circuit case, a plaintiff unsuccessfully looked to a Lou-
isiana statue to provide relief after a franchisor terminated the franchise
relationship. This case shows that in a case where one party claims that
termination was in violation of a state law, courts tend to analyze the
state statute and look to the legislature's intent for applicability
considerations. 7'
Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. involves a challenge
to the applicability of the Louisiana Repurchase of Farm, Industrial, and
Lawn and Garden Equipment by Wholesaler Act (Repurchase Act) 72 to
an AC Delco distributorship agreement. The conflict arose when Delco
purported to terminate the parts agreement by having a letter hand-deliv-
ered to Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. (LCD). The letter notified LCD that
Delco was terminating the contract, effective thirty days after delivery.
The notice did not state or imply that the relationship was being termi-
nated for cause or offer any reason for termination. Shortly after receiv-
ing Delco's termination notice, LCD filed suit complaining that Delco's
termination of the parts agreement violated the Repurchase Act. The
District Court agreed, Delco appealed, and the Fifth Circuit Court
reversed. 73
On appeal, the court studied the Repurchase Act. The court first
looked to the purpose behind the Act, concluding that the Act serves to
protect dealers from arbitrary and precipitous termination or cancellation
of dealership relationships without being furnished adequate advance no-
tice that specifies good cause and gives the dealer an opportunity to cure
the cause. After establishing the Act's purpose, the court looked to the
applicability provision of the Act. After extensive analysis of the statute,
the court concluded that the Act did not apply to the parts agreement
because the statute did not demonstrate an intention to protect dealers
like LCD that stock and sell or distribute generic repair parts only.
Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and dismissed
LCD's Repurchase Act.74
69. Id.
70. Id. at 489.
71. See Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2003).
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:481-490 (West 2003).
73. Lake Charles Diesel, Inc., 328 F.3d at 193-95.






The United States Supreme Court released an important decision dur-
ing the Survey period interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act-
an act frequently used by franchisors to protect their trademark rights. 75
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,76 Victoria's Secret brought an ac-
tion under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) against Victor
and Cathy Moseley-the owners and operators of Victor's Little Secret,
an adult novelty store located in Kentucky. The respondents, affiliated
corporations that owned the Victoria's Secret trademark, alleged that
their famous mark was being diluted by the Moseleys.77 The respondents
alleged in their complaint, among other claims, that their mark was being
diluted in violation of the FTDA because the Moseleys' conduct was
"likely to blur and erode the distinctiveness" and "tarnish the reputation"
of the Victoria's Secret trademark. 78 The only evidentiary support that
respondents provided for this claim was the affidavit of a marketing ex-
pert describing the value of the Victoria's Secret trademark. The expert
did not express any opinion on the dilutive effect of the Moseleys' use of
the name "Victor's Little Secret." The district court did not find that any
blurring had occurred, but ruled in favor of the respondents. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court, expressly rejecting the holding of the
Fourth Circuit in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, which held that a showing of
actual economic harm was required to support a claim of trademark dilu-
tion.79 On appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held
that the FTDA did, in fact, require a showing of actual dilution rather
than only a likelihood of dilution.80
The Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's Ringling Bros. decision
that, where the marks at issue were not identical, the mere fact that con-
sumers mentally associated a junior user's mark with a famous mark is
not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. Instead, the Court read the
FTDA to require an actual showing of dilution. The Court clarified that
their holding did not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an
actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. The Court recognized
that consumer surveys and other means of demonstrating actual dilution
were expensive and often unreliable, but held that plaintiffs must present
evidence of a lessening of the capacity of the subject mark to identify and
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1995).
76. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
77. Id. at 422.
78. Id. at 424.
79. Id. at 424-28 (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999)).
80. Moseley, 539 U.S. at 418, 424-28 & 433.
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distinguish the goods and services identified with that mark.8'
2. Unauthorized Use
On the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit
also released an important decision interpreting the FTDA.82 In ICEE
Distributors, Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., ICEE Distributors initially
brought suit against J & J Snack Foods Corp. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
for trademark infringement and dilution. The distributors had purchased
several regional distributorships, gaining in the process those distributor-
ships' trademark licensing agreements with a predecessor to ICEE of
America (IOA), ICEEQUIP. Distributors and the ICEE Company, a
subsidiary of J & J, formed IOA, which acquired ownership rights to the
ICEE trademarks previously held by ICEEQUIP. J & J began manufac-
turing frozen squeeze-up tubes under the ICEE name and distributing
these products through Wal-Mart stores on a nationwide basis, including
those in distributors' territory. After this action was initially filed, J & J
assigned the trademark application for the ICEE name on the squeeze-up
tubes to IOA, which successfully registered the trademark. Therefore,
Distributors added IOA as a defendant alleging IOA, as assignee of the
trademarks formerly held by ICEEQUIP, was bound by and had
breached licensing agreements that ICEEQUIP had entered into with
distributors.83
At the initial trial, the jury found IOA liable for breach of contract and
J & J and Wal-Mart liable for willful trademark dilution. Based on the
jury verdict, the court entered a permanent injunction against J & J and
Wal-Mart forbidding the sale of the ICEE squeeze-up tubes within dis-
tributors' territory. Defendants appealed.84
The district court's injunction against defendants was based upon the
jury's findings (1) that IOA had breached its contract with the distribu-
tors and (2) that there was alleged dilution of the ICEE trademark
caused by the defendants' actions. The Fifth Circuit did not find any er-
ror in the district court's implicit finding that the distributors were enti-
tled to an injunction based on the breach of contract issue. 85
On the dilution issue, however, the Fifth Circuit looked at the licensing
agreements and found that the distributors' agreement with IOA, under
which it obtained rights in the ICEE trademarks, was only an exclusive
license arrangement, with ultimate control and ownership of the trade-
marks resting with IOA. Consequently, the court held that IOA was the
owner, rather than the distributors, of the ICEE trademarks and, there-
fore, the distributors had no standing to sue under the FTDA. The court
held that the district court had abused its discretion in basing its injunc-
81. Id. at 433.
82. See ICEE Distrbs., Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 325 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 589-90.
84. Id. at 590.
85. Id. at 599.
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tion in part on the dilution claim, but did not reverse the trial court's
grant of the injunction requested by distributors, finding that the injunc-
tion was a proper remedy for IOA's breach of the licensing agreements.8 6
3. Cybersquatting
During the Survey period, a federal district civil court released a deci-
sion regarding the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA). 87 In March Madness Athletic Assoc., L.L.C. v. Netfire, Inc., the
court analyzed whether Netfire, Inc., acting on behalf of Sports Market-
ing International, Inc. (SMI), had a bad faith intent to profit from the
March Madness Athletic Association's "march madness" trademark.88
The court first considered the fair use defense, "which provides that
'[b]ad faith intent. . .shall not be found in any case in which the court
determines that the person believed and had reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise law-
ful."' 89 The court found that SMI's use of "marchmadness.com" was not
fair use under the ACPA because no matter what defendants' subjective
beliefs were, they "did not have 'reasonable grounds' to believe that their
use of marchmadness.com was a fair use." 90 SMI's use, which associated
its website with the NCAA Tournament, was a commercial use that
sought to exploit the goodwill of MMAA's rights to the "march madness"
trademark. 91
The court continued with an analysis to determine SMI's bad faith in-
tent. The court concluded that the nine factors set out in the ACPA ap-
plied to the facts of this case, including that (1) SMI had no intellectual
property in march madness, other than its registration of the domain
name of marchmadness.com; (2) SMI and the other defendants did not
make any prior use of marchmadness.com in connection with the bona
fide offer of goods and services; and (3) the defendants did not make any
bona fide noncommercial or fair use of marchmadness.com. The court
found that the defendants acted with a bad faith intent and that their use
of marchmadness.com was in violation of the ACPA. In assessing dam-
ages, however, the court pointed out that under the statute, damages are
not available for any violation occurring before November 29, 1999. The
evidence showed that by the end of July 1999, the marchmadness.com
website had been placed on hold, so that there was no evidence of "use"
after November 29, 1999; therefore, no damages were awarded. In the
end, the court provided redress for the violation under the statute by or-
dering the transfer of the domain name from the defendants to MMAA. 92
86. Id.
87. See March Madness Athletic Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Netfire, Inc. No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-
398-R, 2003 WL 22047375 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2003); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
88. March Madness Athletic Ass'n, L.L.C., 2003 WL 22047375, at *25-26.
89. Id. at *25 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *26-29.
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As the law continues to develop and people's use of the Internet contin-
ues to grow, it is likely that the ACPA will become a useful statute for
franchisors fighting trademark infringement.
V. COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the prin-
cipal-agent relationship in the context of a franchisee's attempt to sell his
franchise twice.93 In Latch v. Gratty, Inc., Latch, as president and part
owner of Fun Motors of Longview, Inc., signed an asset purchase agree-
ment with Jim Gratton, president and owner of Gratty, Inc., providing for
the purchase of Fun Motor's Kawasaki franchise and other assets. Ap-
proximately five months later, however, Latch entered into an agreement
to sell the Kawasaki franchise and assets to a different buyer, Mr.
Zhorne, signing in his own name without reference to Fun Motors.
"Meanwhile, Kawasaki had instituted proceedings before the Texas De-
partment of Transportation to terminate Fun Motors' Kawasaki franchise
for reasons unrelated to the attempted sale."'94
After the termination of the Kawasaki franchise, Gratty, Inc. brought
the suit which was on appeal in this case against Latch, alleging, among
other things, breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract.
The trial court determined that Latch's conduct interfered with the con-
tract between Gratty and Fun Motors and awarded tort damages, which
the court of appeals upheld. The court of appeals held that Latch was
acting in his individual capacity when he interfered with the Fun Motors-
Gratty asset purchase agreement by signing another contract with
Zhorne. The Texas Supreme Court, however, disagreed. 95
Gratty offered evidence that Latch signed the Gratty-Fun Motors con-
tract with a designation of his agency status, unlike his signature in the
Zhorne agreement, and that he knew how to effect a corporate act. The
acts of a corporate agent on behalf of his principal under Texas law are
ordinarily deemed to be the corporation's acts, unless the plaintiff can
prove that the agent acted to further his personal interests. The court
concluded that the mere fact that Latch signed the agreement without
indicating his agency was not evidence that he acted individually and,
therefore, he could be liable for tortiously interfering with the contract of
his principal, Fun Motors. Latch would have had to have acted so con-
trary to Fun Motors' interests that his actions could only have been moti-
vated by personal interest in order to be liable on the tortious
interference claim. Moreover, under Texas law, an agent cannot be held
to have acted against the principal's interest unless the principal has ob-
jected and, in this case, there was no evidence that Fun Motors com-
93. See Latch v. Gratty, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. 2003).
94. Id. at 544.
95. Id. at 545.
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plained of Latch's conduct. The Texas Supreme Court, therefore,
reversed the lower court's judgment on Gratty's tortious interference
claim and rendered judgment that Gratty take nothing. 96
B. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA, Co.,97 ice cream store franchisees
sued their franchisor, asserting fraud and tortious interference, among
other claims. The district court held that Baskin Robbins had not com-
mitted fraud by not disclosing that certain store formats were unviable
and certain stores were to be phased out. The court began its discussion
by noting that many of the franchisees' claims were an attempt to make
breach of contract claims into a tortious act. This was problematic be-
cause it is generally accepted that a franchisor-franchisee relationship
does not, by itself, create fiduciary duties between the parties-duties
which are necessary in creating common-law tort liability.98
The plaintiff franchisees claimed that Baskin Robbins had a duty to
disclose to them that certain stores were unviable and that the franchisor
intended to phase out "nonstrategic locations." 99 The court, however,
noted that the franchisees' presumption of such a duty was premised on
the existence of a fiduciary relationship-a relationship that was not cre-
ated by the parties' contractual relationship alone. The franchisor had
created a trust for advertisement funds from the franchisees, but the court
would not extend any fiduciary duties attached to that fund to other as-
pects of the parties' relationship not related to the maintenance of the
advertisement fund. Even assuming that Baskin Robbins did have a duty
to disclose, the court said that the franchisees could not show that Baskin
Robbins had knowledge of prior or present facts regarding "nonstrategic
market" decisions that it should have disclosed.1° ° Baskin Robbins was
saved from liability for fraud in this case by the nature of the franchise
relationship. In some instances, however, other defenses may be used by
the franchisor.
Fraud claims may be estopped by clear and unambiguous contract lan-
guage. In DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C. v. VM Motori, S.P.A., the
Houston Court of Appeals gave great weight to the unambiguous terms
96. Id. at 545-46.
97. Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA, Co., No. 5:99-CV-274, 2003 WL 21309428 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 2003).
98. Id. at *1, 3 (citing Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Del Monte Corp., 1990 WL 291495,
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1990) (applying California law and Ninth Circuit cases)),
99. Id. at *3
100. Id. at *3-4. Plaintiffs failed to follow the Local Court Rules requiring a statement
of all controverted facts and at the hearing only pointed to two pieces of evidence to sup-
port their claims, which the court found insufficient: a 1985 marketing plan created by
company employees and franchisees for the Chicago area and Baskin Robbins' discontinu-
ance of national advertising in favor of concentrating on larger metropolitan markets for a
ten-year period. See id. at *4.
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of a distribution agreement between the parties.101 The agreement be-
tween DRC and VM contained the following provision:
VM. . .grants on a non-exclusive basis. . .DRC. . .the right to
purchase and sell VM diesel engine ORIGINAL SPARE PARTS for
engine series and/or engine model versions not in-current production
by VM and VM ORIGINAL ACCESSORIES for current and non-
current series of engines, in the USA or Canada, hereinafter referred
to as the TERRITORY .... 102
DRC, however, brought suit against VM asserting breach of contract
and fraud when VM sold the parts covered by the provision above to
other parties. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of VM.
DRC appealed. 10 3
DRC challenged summary judgment on its breach of contract claim on
the ground that the contract was ambiguous. DRC contended that the
term "non-exclusive" used in the provision set forth above could reasona-
bly be interpreted to mean either that "(1) VM retained the right to sell
parts for engines not in current production through entities other than
DRC; or (2) DRC had the exclusive right to sell such parts."10 4
The court reasoned that, under Texas law, the contract was not ambigu-
ous. First, the language of the distribution agreement did not support an
exclusive right to sell the parts at issue. Second, parol evidence about the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract was not admissi-
ble under Texas law to create an ambiguity when the language of the
distribution agreement was unambiguous. Parol evidence can only be
considered to determine the meaning of the language of the contract
when it is ambiguous, either on its face or when applied to the subject
matter of the contract. 10 5
DRC also challenged summary judgment on its fraudulent inducement
claim. DRC contended that "if the contract term 'non-exclusive' was un-
ambiguous, [as the court concluded], then a fact issue was raised on its
fraudulent inducement claim by evidence that VM falsely represented to
DRC that it would have exclusive rights to distribute the subject engine
parts under the agreement.' 10 6 The court focused its attention on one
element of a fraud claim-that a plaintiff must actually and justifiable
rely on the misrepresentation to suffer injury. The court found that DRC
was not justified, as a matter of law, in relying upon an oral representa-
tion that was directly contradicted by the express, unambiguous terms of
the distributor agreement. To decide otherwise, the court believed,
"would defeat the ability of written contracts to provide certainty and
101. DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C. v. VM Motori, S.P.A., 112 S.W.3d 854 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
102. Id. at 856.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 857.
105. Id. at 857-58.
106. Id. at 858.
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avoid dispute. '107 Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment upon
this point was also affirmed and DRC's claim again denied.108 It is worth
noting that the dissent found DRC's evidence to be sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact, in spite of the language of the contract, and
spent significant time discussing the difficulty in balancing the parol evi-
dence rule with the proof required in a fraudulent inducement claim. 10 9
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Going after the "deep pocket" is a common route for franchisees to
take in litigation and so once again, during the Survey period, a Texas
court made a decision on a franchisor's vicarious liability for the acts or
negligence of its franchisee. In Fitz v. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc., Fitz ap-
pealed summary judgment granted in favor of Days Inn Worldwide, Inc.
(DIW) in hopes that that DIW would be found vicariously liable for the
negligence of its franchisee, San Antonio Hospitality Investments, Inc.
(SAHI). Fitz was the victim of hit and run accident in the parking lot of a
Days Inn hotel owned by SAHI.110
The court began by analyzing whether DIW, as a hotel franchisor,
owed a duty to Fitz to control the safety of SAHI's driveway.1"1 The
court noted that liability of a franchisor regarding negligence on a fran-
chisee's premises appeared to be limited to those activities, alleged to be
negligent and over which the franchisor maintained control.11 2
The right of a franchisor to control the franchisee and thereby become
vicariously liable for the franchisee's actions can be proven in two ways:
(1) by evidence of a contractual agreement that explicitly assigns the
premises owner a right to control; and (2) in the absence of a con-
tractual agreement, by evidence that the premises owner actually ex-
ercised control over the manner in which the independent
contractor's work was performed. 113
Fitz argued that DIW exercised both contractual and actual control.
As evidence of the contractual right to control, Fitz contended that the
license agreement between DIW and SAHI and the Days Inn System
Standards Manual, considered together, took away almost all of SAHI's
discretion in determining how to run the hotel. Since the Days Inn Sys-
tem Standards Manual contained standards regarding parking lot design
and pedestrian safety, areas where the hotel's negligent design had been
found to have proximately caused Fitz's injuries, Fitz's contention was
that DIW should be vicariously liable for failing to shut down SAHI's
107. Id. at 859.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 859 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
110. Fitz v. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc., No. 04-02-00487-CV, 2003 WL 22238939, *1 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Oct. 1, 2003, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *2 (interpreting Risner v. McDonald's Corp., 18 S.W.3d 903, 906 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).
113. Id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 605-06 (Tex. 2002)).
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illegal and negligently maintained truck driveway.' 14 Upon examining
the summary judgment evidence, however, the court found that "no pro-
vision in either the License Agreement or the [Days Inn] System Stan-
dards Manual gave DIW the contractual right to control either the
means, methods, or details of SAHI's maintenance and operation of the
parking lot or the methods by which SAHI complied with the minimum
standards set by DIW." 115 Moreover, DIW's setting of general minimum
standards for franchisees did not negate the provision of the license
agreement where the parties explicitly acknowledged that SAHI was an
independent contractor. 1 6
Fitz also failed to present evidence that DIW had an actual right of
control over SAHI. Fitz again made the argument that the Days Inn Sys-
tem Standards Manual gave DIW actual control because DIW could en-
force compliance with these standards by its franchisees. The court
reiterated, however, that the manual did not give DIW the right to con-
trol either the means, methods, or details of SAHI's maintenance and
operation of the parking lot at issue. The court also agreed with DIW's
response that its ability to suspend operation if minimum standards were
not followed was not a sufficient level of control to expose it to
liability.117
Fitz's second argument was that DIW exercised control through its in-
spections of SAHI's premises and notices to cure. If SAHI failed to cure
a defect, then DIW could suspend it from participating in the Days Inn
Reservation System or terminate the license agreement. Again the court
noted that there was no evidence that SAHI was not free to do its own
work in its own way and there is no evidence that DIW controlled
SAHI's method of work or its operative detail. 118
Finally Fitz argued that DIW exercised actual control by waiving its
right to require SAHI to make the truck entrance safe for the public.
Specifically, Fitz alleged that DIW knew about the unauthorized and dan-
gerous change for truck access, which was a proximate cause of Fitz's
injuries through its inspections of the property. The inspections alone,
however, were insufficient evidence that DIW knew of the alleged dan-
gerous condition and approved the condition of the driveway. Therefore,
the court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of DIW.119
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The importance of a franchise agreement that provides flexibility to the
franchisor was borne out in the Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA, Co. case,
114. Id. at *3.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *5-6.
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discussed above. 120 Plaintiff franchisees complained that Baskin Robbins
had tortiously interfered with their contractual relations by not allowing
the franchisees to sell their franchises to third parties by informing them
that their franchises would not be renewed. The franchise agreement had
a section explicitly providing Baskin Robbins the right to withhold con-
sent to transfer the contract. Thus, the court found that "Baskin Rob-
bins' conduct could not give rise to a tortious interference claim . . .
because they had an absolute right not to allow the transfer.'' 1  The
plaintiff franchisees' tortious interference claim was denied and summary
judgment granted on this claim in favor of Baskin Robbins. 122
In Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mexico, Inc., Taco
Cabana of New Mexico and the other defendants counterclaimed alleging
that Texas Taco Cabana and T.C. Management were interfering with Taco
Cabana of New Mexico's relationships with its suppliers, employees, and
other third parties, as well as with its prospective contractual relations
with customers.123 As a matter of Texas law, a parent corporation is inca-
pable of tortiously interfering with its subsidiary's contracts because their
financial interests are identical. Carrols, one of the defendants, was the
corporate parent of T.C. Management, and, thus it could not interfere
with the contract between T.C. Management and Taco Cabana of New
Mexico. Consequently, Taco Cabana of New Mexico's claim against Car-
rols for tortious interference with contracts between T.C. Management
and Taco Cabana of New Mexico were dismissed. The court would not
dismiss, however, the claims of interference with suppliers, employees
and other third parties.124
E. COMMON-LAW DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Franchisees commonly claim that their franchisor has violated a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the relationship. Under Texas law, how-
ever, there is ordinarily no duty of good faith and fair dealing in commer-
cial contracts because the franchisor-franchisee relationship is not usually
the kind of special relationship that would create such a duty. 125 In Texas
Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mexico, Inc., however, the
court found that the franchisor's interactions with the franchisee had cre-
ated such a duty. The court stated that the "duty may arise if one person
trusts and relies on another. 1 26
120. See Brock v. Baskin Robbins, USA, Co., No. 5:99-CV-274, 2003 WL 21309428
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003).
121. Id. at *7.
122. Id. at *8.
123. Tex. Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-07
(W.D. Tex. 2003).
124. Id. at 912.
125. Id. at 911-23.
126. Id. at 911 (citing Crim. Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823
S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992)).
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Here, the defendant franchisees pled facts to show that Mr. Sloan, ap-
parently a principal of the franchisee entities who was diagnosed with
brain cancer, relied on the promises of the franchisor that the franchisee's
development rights under the agreements would not be jeopardized by
any delay caused by Mr. Sloan's focus upon his health. Mr. Sloan focused
on his health and delayed the construction of his restaurant. Texas Taco
Cabana and T.C. Management subsequently sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the defendants had no right to develop additional Taco Cabana
restaurants and no rights of first refusal related to the development of
Taco Cabana restaurants in New Mexico. The defendants pled that Mr.
Sloan would have been able to proceed in a timely manner had it been
necessary under the contract. He had, however, received assurances from
the franchisor that it was not necessary to do so. Under these circum-
stances, the court found that the interactions between the franchisor and
franchisee created a special relationship that gave rise to the duty of good
faith under Texas law. Therefore, the court would not dismiss the defend-
ants' claims against the franchisor. 127
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
In order to sustain a cause of action under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), a party must be a con-
sumer. 128 In Brock v. Baskin-Robbins, USA Co., the district court held
that a franchisee was not a consumer for purposes of the DTPA.129 In
Brock, a group of more than forty franchisees brought an action against
Baskin-Robbins. 130 Plaintiffs complained that Baskin-Robbins misrepre-
sented its intent to renew their franchise agreements and mishandled
commercial advertising funds. 131 In addressing the DTPA claim, the
court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were "consumers"
under either Texas' or Louisiana's Consumer Protection Acts.1 32 In do-
ing so, the court noted that a claimant must be a consumer who sought or
acquired goods or services by purchase or lease and demonstrate that
these goods or services formed the basis for the complaint.1 33 Plaintiffs
relied on Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta in arguing that the
intangible rights conveyed under their franchise agreements carried a
number of collateral services on which plaintiffs relied and, therefore,
127. Id.
128. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. 1987).
129. Brock v. Baskin-Robbins, USA, Co., No. 5:99-CV-274, 2003 WL 21309428, *5-6
(E.D. Tex Jan. 17, 2003).
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id.




plaintiffs were "consumers" under the purview of the statute.134 The
Brock court dismissed this reasoning and held that the purchaser in
Brock bought an intangible right and that the underlying goods and ser-
vices were merely collateral services that would not support a claim under
the DTPA.135
In Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mexico, Inc., plain-
tiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that defendants did not
have a right to develop any additional Taco Cabana restaurants in New
Mexico and that there was no right of first refusal for defendants in New
Mexico. 136 Defendants countersued, asserting several claims including
claims under the DTPA (Texas and New Mexico) as well as claims for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.137 The franchisor
moved to dismiss the DTPA claims. The claims under the New Mexico
Deceptive Trade Practices Act were dismissed because the court found
Texas law, rather than New Mexico law, governed the tort claims.138
The franchisor then argued for dismissal of the Texas claims asserting
(1) they were fundamentally based only on a disagreement over the inter-
pretation of the contracts at issue rather than on unconscionable acts, and
(2) the reliance necessary under Texas law to sustain a DTPA action was
not present because the franchisees acknowledged that they would con-
duct their own investigation concerning the volume, profits, or success of
the business venture.1 39 The court rejected both arguments. Although
the court agreed that a disagreement over the interpretation of a contract
was not actionable under the DTPA, the court held that the DTPA claims
at issue were not only based on a disagreement of interpretation, but
were also based on allegations of the existence of false pretenses.140
The court then turned to the "lack of reliance" argument. The court
stated that the necessary reliance existed because when a party to a con-
tract contractually agreed that he or she was not relying on any represen-
tations, the stipulation might negate reliance, but only reliance on
representations expressly excluded by the written disclaimer. 141 Thus,
the franchisee's reliance on representations or information outside of the
scope of the disclaimer were actionable.1 42
134. Id. at *6 (citing Tex. Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, 747 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
135. Id.
136. Texas Taco Cabana, L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-07
(W.D. Tex. 2003).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 909-10.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 910-11.
141. Id. (citing Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Tresprop, Ltd., No. 98-2511-DJW, 2000
WL 290349, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 10, 2000); Commercial Prop. Invs., Inc. v. Quality Inns




B. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Although not a franchise case, a Texas appellate court recently over-
ruled a prior franchise-related opinion out of the same court in Cardinal
Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen. 143 Both opinions were issued and
reported during the Survey period. Originally, the court held that under
Texas law, a franchisor need not demonstrate irreparable harm to obtain
a preliminary injunction against a franchisee violating a non-compete
agreement.144 In Norlyn Enterprises, Inc., the trial court denied an in-
junction because the franchisor allegedly failed to demonstrate irrepara-
ble harm and an inadequate legal remedy.145 Specifically, the court
found that the franchise system was "neither unique nor proprietary,"
and thus, it did not constitute a trade secret. 146 Further, the trial court
held that because the franchisor was not doing business in the fran-
chisee's former territory, it was not harmed by the franchisee's competi-
tion. 147 On appeal, the court held that the Texas Covenants Not to
Compete Act contained no precise standard for preliminary injunctive
relief, and thus "[a] showing.., of an irreparable injury for which [there
is] no adequate legal remedy is not a prerequisite for obtaining injunctive
relief under [the Act]. 1 48 In Bowen, the same court went to great
lengths to review its prior reasoning, ultimately overruling the holding of
Norlyn Enters. Co. and held that irreparable harm was a required show-
ing under the Act.149
In Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh, the court denied a franchisor's
motion to enjoin its former franchisee from competing in a certain mar-
ket and using its trade secrets because the franchisor failed to present
evidence of irreparable harm. 50 Total Car Franchising Corp. (TCFC), a
franchisor of the Colors on Parade paint restoration businesses, agreed to
allow its Georgia franchisee to relocate to Dallas at the request of the
franchisee.' 5 ' Once in Dallas, the franchisee worked for the TCFC area
developer, David Jordan. The parties disputed whether the franchisee
worked for Jordan as a franchisee or an employee. In 2001, the fran-
chisee and Jordan had a dispute and dissolved their working relationship.
The franchisee, however, retained the accounts that he had while working
for Jordan. The franchise agreement included non-competition and con-
143. See Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
144. See Norlyn Enters., Inc. v. APDP, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, no pet.), overruled by Cardinal Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d
230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
145. Norlyn Enters., Inc., 95 S.W.3d at 581-82.
146. Id. at 582.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 585.
149. Bowen, 106 S.W. 3d at 238-41.
150. Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh, No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0141R, 2002 WL
31757640, at *2 (N.D. Tex. December 4, 2002).




Based in part on these contractual obligations, TCFC sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to enjoin the franchisee's competition in the Dallas-Fort
Worth metropolitan area, as well as its use of TCFC's trade secrets. 53
Focusing on the irreparable harm requirement of the preliminary injunc-
tion standard, the court held that TCFC was not entitled to injunctive
relief because it failed to present evidence that the harm it suffered could
not be addressed later in the proceedings. 154 The court denied the mo-
tion and stated "[tihe mere existence of an 'adverse effect' was insuffi-
cient to establish the 'irreparable harm' element of a preliminary
injunction. '155
C. ANTITRUST
In The Coca-Cola Company v. Harmar Bottling Co, a group of carbon-
ated soft drink bottlers brought an action against Coca-Cola and its bot-
tlers for restraint of trade, monopolistic practices, and interference with
existing and prospective business relationships due to marketing agree-
ments with retailers. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs on a
jury verdict for $13,800,000 in damages, awarded attorneys' fees, and is-
sued a marketing injunction. Coca-Cola appealed.1 56
The lawsuit centered on complaints made by several different carbon-
ated soft drink bottlers who currently sold or had previously sold soft
drinks in competition with Coca-Cola. The bottlers alleged Coca-Cola
employed improper business methods and practices through the use of a
vehicle called calendar marketing agreements (CMAs). The bottlers al-
leged that the CMA's prevented retailers from selling a competitor's car-
bonated soft drinks. Coca-Cola held the franchises for Coca-Cola, Dr.
Pepper, and other beverages in the territory at issue. 157 The court found
that Coca-Cola's own information showed that Coca-Cola maintained a
seventy-five to eighty percent share of the area's carbonated soft drink
market during the relevant time period. The bottlers' claims concen-
trated on the substance of the CMAs used by Coca-Cola in contracting
with its retailers.1 58
On appeal, Coca-Cola contended that "the trial court erred in its extra
territorial application of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act
(hereafter the Act)" in awarding plaintiff both monetary damages and
injunctive relief.1 59 Coca-Cola argued that "none of [the] agreements-
to the extent they were implemented in retail establishments outside the
152. Id.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2003, pet. filed).
157. Id. at 293.
158. Id. at 293.
159. Id. at 294.
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State of Texas-were actionable under [Texas] state statute. '160 The
court found, however, that the language of the Texas statute was clear in
its intent to cover monopolistic practices in commerce "occurring wholly
or partly within the State of Texas. '161 The court noted that the case
"involve[d] anti-competitive conduct that occurred partly in Texas and
which affect[ed] consumers in Texas and other states. A number of the
retailers signed contracts with Coca-Cola that covered their entire area,
including stores in and outside of Texas ... [which] necessarily affect[ed]
Texas commerce. ' 162 The court found that Coca-Cola's position-that
the effects of competition disappeared and dissipated at state lines-was
not tenable. The court found that "each contract was prepared and exe-
cuted in Texas and provide[d] that Texas law govern[ed] it and any dis-
putes arising thereunder." 163 The court held that "having chosen Texas
law for these particular contracts, Coca-Cola could not avoid the protec-
tion to Texas consumers provided by that same law."' 164
Coca-Cola argued that the evidence presented to the jury was insuffi-
cient to support their findings that Coca-Cola's conduct was an unreason-
able restraint of trade under the Act. 165  In order to prevail under the
Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the restraint of trade is unreasonable,
and (2) that the restraint of trade has an adverse effect on competition in
the relevant market.166 "[Coca-Cola] argu[ed] that, because there [was]
no or insufficient evidence to show that the other Bottlers were com-
pletely or at least predominantly 'foreclosed' from competition, the Bot-
tlers [could not] recover under antitrust theories. '167 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that complete foreclosure was not essential to
recovery. 168
Coca-Cola also contended that there was no or insufficient evidence to
support the jury's findings that Coca-Cola engaged in an unreasonable
restraint of trade. The court found that even if it were to wholly disre-
gard the bottlers' expert testimony, which it did not, there would be some
evidence to support the jury's findings on restraint of trade. Although
Coca-Cola argued that various factors were insufficient to allow the jury
to conclude Coca-Cola had acted to restrain trade, the court found that
due to the numerous factors presented in evidence, it was not appropriate
to take this determination out of the hands of the jury. The court noted
that this was a multi-week jury trial with considerable evidence about
these issues. The court found that the evidence was both legally and fac-
tually sufficient to support the jury's answer. 169
160. Id.




165. Id. at 301.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 302.
169. Id. at 302-03.
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The case is now pending before the Texas Supreme Court. On October
3, 2003, Coca-Cola filed its petition for review. On January 29, 2004,
briefing on the merits was requested by the supreme court.
VII. REMEDIES, DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The main issue in Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc.,170
involved the enforcement of a liquidated damages provision and personal
guarantees under New Jersey law. Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc.
(RFS) and Jacobcart, Inc. entered into a license agreement for the opera-
tion of a hotel in Denison, Texas. A contract dispute arose between RFS
and Jacobcart, Inc., and two guarantors, Joy M. Cart and Chacko Cart,
owners of the hotel. Cart and Jacob signed personal guarantees agreeing
that all of the licensee's obligations under the license agreement would be
performed in a timely manner.
From December 1999 to October 2000, RFS experienced problems
with Jacobcart's performance under the license agreement. First, the ho-
tel failed several quality assurance inspections. After each inspection,
RFS gave Jacobcart written notice of the failed inspection and told Jacob-
cart that if the defaults were not cured, it would be in breach the license
agreement. Next, RFS notified Jacobcart that it was in default of its fi-
nancial obligations under the license agreement for failure to file its re-
quired monthly franchise reports and failure to pay its accounts
receivable. Finally, on October 2, 2000, RFS sent Jacobcart a letter termi-
nating the license agreement and advising Jacobcart that it must immedi-
ately stop using the Ramada trade name and service marks (the Ramada
Marks). In addition, the letter advised Jacobcart that it was required to
pay RFS $200,000 in liquidated damages for premature termination of the
agreement, and that it should de-identify its facility within ten days of
receipt of the letter and pay RFS its outstanding recurring fees.
Jacobcart nonetheless continued to use the Ramada Marks and did not
pay RFS liquidated damages or recurring fees. RFS then filed suit seek-
ing damages and injunctive relief. The court granted injunctive relief in a
separate opinion.171 RFS then moved for summary judgment on its dam-
ages claims.
The contract was governed by New Jersey law. 172 Under New Jersey
law, liquidated damages provisions are upheld when the amount of dam-
170. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0306-N, (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 21, 2003) Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 12,609.
171. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. CIVA 3:05CV0306D, 2001 WL
540213 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2001).
172. The court applied the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, Texas, because the
case was in federal court based on diversity. Under Texas law, as long as the transaction
bore a reasonable relationship to the state specified in the license agreement's choice-of-
law provision, that state's laws would apply to the case. Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) at
12,609 (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990)). Because
RFS's principal place of business was New Jersey, the court found that the contract "bore a
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ages was a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused
by the breach and when the harm was very difficult or impossible to
estimate.
The court found that the liquidated damages provision in the case was
reasonable and was enforceable as a matter of law for several reasons.
First, the court found that "damages from breach or early termination of
the license agreement were difficult to estimate when the agreement was
drafted because of variations in the travel industry."'1 73
From changing seasons to special events to the increased competi-
tion, it is virtually impossible to predict a hotel occupancy over an
extended period of time. Along the same lines, because the license
agreement covered a fifteen year period, it was difficult to predict
Jacobcart's income that far into the future.174
Finally, New Jersey law presumed that liquidated damages clauses were
enforceable. Thus, the party protesting the clause had the burden to
prove that it was unreasonable and that it should not be enforced. Jacob-
cart failed to challenge the enforceability of the clause as it did not plead
the affirmative defense of penalty. Thus, the court held that "the liqui-
dated damages provision of the license agreement was enforceable as a
matter of law." '175
RFS also alleged that Jacobcart owed past recurring fees plus interest.
Jacobcart did not deny that it owed RFS fees; however, it disagreed with
RFS about the total amount owed. In its reply brief, RFS agreed to ac-
cept the amount of money Jacobcart believed it owed plus the contractual
interest rate of 1.5% monthly. The court found that because RFS waived
its claim for the larger figure and no other fact issue regarding the fees
existed, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate regarding the pay-
ment of recurring fees.
Finally, the court found that Jacob and Cart were personally liable for
Jacobcart's financial commitments under the license agreement because
they both signed a guaranty to that effect. Because Jacob and Cart did
not deny the existence of the guaranty or argue that it was somehow inva-
lid, they failed to raise a fact issue regarding its application. Thus, the
court granted RFS judgment as a matter of law regarding the guaranty
claims.
The court also found that a provision of the license agreement granting
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party was enforceable and that Jacob and
Cart's personal guaranty included this portion of the contract. Thus, the
court found that as a matter of law it was appropriate to allow RFS' claim
for attorneys' fees.
reasonable relation to New Jersey" and New Jersey law governed the contract. Bus.
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) at 12,609.






In the Coca-Cola Co. vs. Harmar Bottling Co., one of the issues on
appeal was whether the evidence submitted at trial supported an award of
attorneys' fees. In particular, Coca-Cola contended that there was no evi-
dence to support the trial court's award of attorneys' fees for the injunc-
tive proceeding because the only evidence of such fees was the affidavit
of plaintiff's counsel. The court noted that it was clear from the record
that the court did not rely on that affidavit for its award. The trial court,
instead, took judicial notice of its file and the proceedings before it and
found that a reasonable attorneys' fee was $500,000.176
The appellate court noted that the reasonableness of attorneys' fees
was generally a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact and
must be supported by competent evidence. In general, "a trial court may
not adjudicate reasonableness on judicial knowledge and without the
benefit of evidence. ' 177 The court noted that, "while Chapter 38 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code contain[ed] an exception to this
general rule, it [was] applicable only to the types of claims described in
Section 38.001."178 Because the claim for injunctive relief was not a claim
described in Section 38.001, "the trial court erred in awarding attorneys'
fees absent any evidence to support a finding that such fees were reasona-
ble."' 179 Thus, the "portion of the trial court's judgments awarding attor-
neys' fees [was] reversed and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings." 180
C. INJUNCTIONS
In Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh,181 as discussed above, the court
denied a franchisor's motion to enjoin its former franchisee from compet-
ing in a certain market and from using its trade secrets because the
franchisor failed to present evidence of irreparable harm.
In Norlyn Enterprises, Inc. v. APDP, Inc.,182 the franchisor sued its
franchisee for breach of contract and sought a temporary injunction to
enforce the noncompetition clause in the franchise agreement. The dis-
trict court denied the injunction and the franchisor appealed. The Hous-
ton Appellate Court held that under the Covenants Not to Compete Act,
the franchisor did not have to show irreparable injury to obtain a tempo-
rary injunction. 183 This ruling was later overruled by the same court in
176. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 311-312 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana 2003, pet. filed).




181. Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh, No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0141R, 2002 WL
31757640, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2002).
182. See Norlyn Enters., Inc. v. APDP, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist] 2002, no pet.), overruled by Cardinal Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
183. Id. at 583-84.
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Cardinal Staffing Networks, Inc. v. Bowen.184
184. See Bowen, 106 S.W.3d at 230.
